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Comparing these costs shows that, if Cbp < Cp + Cb then, in the non-electoral period, it will certainly 
be more convenient to appoint a single agent. In the election period, it will all depend on the 
difference 
Cbp - Cp + R – [Cb + (R/2)] = Cbp – (Cb + Cp) + (R/2) 
If this difference is zero, it will not matter at all whether one or two agents are appointed. If the 
value is >0, then one agent costs more than two agents and therefore it is better to appoint two 
agents; if on the other hand Cbp – (Cb + Cp) + (R/2) <0, it will be more suitable to appoint a single 
agent. The cost difference will rise in proportion to R, the reputation cost, assessed by the central 
governor. 
Firstly, it would be interesting to identify proxies to measure the governor’s reputation effect. 
Secondly, an empirical analysis could be made of whether or not these indicators of reputation are 
connected to the outcome of monetary and supervision policy. It should be remembered that the 
problem of measurability also exists for the second function mentioned.   
 
10. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the advantage to be gained in entrusting the jobs of “banking supervision” and 
“monetary policy” to two agents, Banking Authority (BA) and Central Bank (CB), or to a single 
agent, CB. In examining the policy maker’s choice between single or multiple authorities, the role 
of the political cycles was appraised.  For this purpose, two periods were examined: electoral and 
non-electoral. The model is that of a principal with two agents, where the principal is the political 
group in power, while the agents are, as we have said, BA and CB.  
The reached conclusion is that the political chooses the institutional design of regulatory authorities 
without being influenced by the electoral cycle. What is interesting is the importance of the costs of 
"capture", related to the different institutional hypotheses. The political will have convenience to 
choose a centralized setup, in the pre-electoral period, when the value that the head of the CB 
(governor) gives to his reputation is rather low. This will occur with higher probability when the 
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central banker is little conservative. A governor with a lower inflation aversion will leave "to 
involve" himself from the political in a more expansionary monetary policy. In this case, monetary 
policy and supervision policy, go to the same direction. The probability, in fact, to have a stable 
banking system is higher when  monetary policy is more “easy-going”. Therefore the presence of an 
a little conservative central banker means choice of a design of monetary and supervision policy 
both centralized in the hands of the central bank.    
Otherwise if the governor of the central bank is very adverse to the inflation, hardly the government 
will "capture" the governor. In such case, it will be advantageous for the political to assign the 
responsibility of supervision policy to an authority distinguished from the central bank.  
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